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Impulse and Animal Action in Stoic Psychology
John A. Stevens 
East Carolina University
There is contradictory evidence on the cause o f impulse, op μη, in Stoic psychology. 
Sources clearly indicate that impulse cannot occur without assent, συγκα τά θ εσ ή  (Plut. De Stoic, 
rep. 1057A = SVF  3.175) and that impulses are assents (Stob. E el 2.88.1-6 = SVF  3.171). But 
other sources indicate that the actual cause o f impulse is not assent but impression, φ αντασία  
(Stob. Eel. 2.86.17-18 = SVF  3.169), “They (the Stoics) say that what moves an impulse is 
nothing other than an hormetic impression o f something that is self-evidently appropriate.” 1 
Some texts openly suggest that impulse may precede assent (Plut. Adv. Col. 1122A-B; Sen. Ep. 
113.18 = SVF 3.169; Cic. Defa to  40 = SVF 2.974, Origen D eprinc. 3.4 = SVF  2.988).
At stake is the Stoic explanation o f a familiar problem: one sees something tempting, and 
feels “attracted” toward it, then resolves to resist the temptation. That is, human experience 
suggests that choice involves more than deliberation in propositional form; one feels a sort o f pull 
toward potential objects o f choice before a decision is reached. Since yielding to this “pull” can 
result in improper actions, the Stoic view o f the cause o f passion is involved. Moreover, if  there 
are drives within us that “attract” us to things, the issue o f  dualism also comes into play.
One solution to the apparent conflict in the evidence is to posit the existence o f a 
“preliminary” impulse, before a “final” impulse is approved by assent. Ioppolo argues that 
Chrysippus altered Zeno’s position in which preliminary impulse precedes assent.2 Inwood 
argues that the move to create preliminary impulse comes later, in response to pressures from the 
Skeptical Academy (supra n. 1 179), and he takes a firm stance against preliminary impulse in the 
old Stoa, “No orthodox Stoic could say that an impulse could occur in an adult human either 
before or independently o f  an assent” (ibid. 176). I shall set out the evidence that shows impulse 
preceding assent, my conclusion from which is that impulse does precede assent even for the old 
Stoa, though assent has final control over it. In fact the evidence is consistent when one 
considers a sufficiently complex model o f action. The evidence also suggests that the 
“preliminary passions”, προπάθειαι, are instances o f this kind o f impulse, and that these were 
recognized as contributing factors to passion.
1 το bk κινούν την όρμην ovbkv ϊτερον είναι Κίγονσιν ο λ λ ’ η φαντασίαν ομηρικήν τον καθήκοντος αύτόθεν. 
dissent from Long and Sedley’s translation The Hellenistic Philosophers (Cambridge 1987) 1.317, 2.318 and 
follow more closely Inwood, Ethics and Human Action in Ancient Stoicism (Cambridge 1985) 224.
2 A. M. Ioppolo, “II monismo psicológico degli Stoic antichi,” Elenchos 8 (1987) 449-66.
I
I. Evidence for the O rder of Impulse and Assent
2
Ioppolo sets out the evidence suggesting that impulse precedes assent ([supra n.2] 458- 
61). Plutarch reports (Adv. C ol 1122A-B) the substance o f the apraxia-debate between Zeno 
and Arcesilaus. Having argued that the criterion o f judgment, φαντασία  καταληπτική , (and thus 
the possibility o f  assent) does not exist, Arcesilaus argues for the viability o f living by 
suspension o f judgment, ίποχη , even on Stoic principles:
The soul has three movements: impression, impulse and assent. The movement o f 
impression we could not remove, even if we wanted to; rather, as soon as we 
encounter things, we are necessarily stamped and affected by them. The 
movement o f impulse, when roused to action toward appropriate things by 
impression, moves a person, since a kind o f turn o f the scale and inclination occur 
in the hegemonikon. So those who suspend judgment about everything do not 
remove this, but at the prompting o f nature use impulse, which leads them 
towards what appears appropriate.3
Arcesilaus would not have been able to sustain the argument that impulse can occur without 
assent had the Stoa clearly maintained that assent precedes impulse. But in fact the citation from 
Stobaeus (supra n .l)  suggests they probably did not, and that Arcesilaus’ account makes 
legitimate use o f Stoic principles. Ioppolo argues that had assent preceded impulse in Zeno’s 
psychology o f action, Arcesilaus’ argument would not have solved the apraxia-argument (459).
The order o f action suggested above is impression, impulse, assent, action. This order is 
also affirmed by Seneca (Ep. 113.18 = SV F 3 .169):
Every rational animal does nothing unless first it has been aroused by the 
impression o f something, and then has had an impulse, and then assent has 
confirmed this impulse. What this assent is, I shall explain. “It is appropriate 
that I walk”; then finally I walk, whenever I have said this to  myself and approved 
this opinion o f  mine.4
This order is also implied in a controversial text from Cicero De fo to  40. In the midst o f reporting 
Chrysippus’ seminal doctrine that assent gives man freedom from necessity, Cicero inserts an 
argument attributed only to the Stoics generally. He cites first a list o f philosophers who held 
that all things happen by fate, then those who deny fate, and says that Chrysippus wished to act
3 τριών ire pi την ψυχήν κινημάτων οντων, φανταστικόν καί ορμητικού και συγκαταθζτικον, το pcv 
φανταστικόν ουδέ βουλομίvois àvckciv ϊστιν, άλλ’ ανάγκη προζντυγχάνοντας τοίς ττράγμασι τοποϋσθαι και 
πάσχαν ύπ’ αυτών, το δ’ ορμητικόν €γαρόμ^ον υπό του φανταστικού προς τα oiKcîa πρακτικών κινet τον 
άνθρωπον, οϊον ροπής kv τώ ηγ€μονικφ και ν€ύσεως γινομίνης. ovÔc τοϋτ’ ονν άναιρονσιν οί π€ρι πάντων 
€πίχοντ€ς, άλλα γρώνται τη ορμή φνσικώς άγονση προς το φαινόμζνον oÍkciov.
4 Oírme rationale animal nihil agit, nisi primum specie alicuius rei inritatum est, deinde impetum cepit, deinde 
adsensio confirmavit hunc impetum. Quid sit adsensio, dicam. Oportet me ambulare: tunc demum ambulo, cum 
hoc mihi dixi et adprobavi hanc opinionem meam.
3as “honorary arbiter” o f the dispute, but addressed himself to the fatalists. Two sentences later, 
the putatively Stoic argument follows:
But those (sc. the Stoics) who dissent from them (sc. the fatalists) freed assents 
from fate and denied, if  fate is applicable to assents, that necessity can be removed 
from them; and these used to argue as follows, “if all things happen by fate, all 
things happen by an antecedent cause; and if impulse, then also the things that 
follow impulse, therefore also assents; but if the causé o f impulse is not in our 
power, not even impulse itself is in our power; and if this is so, not even those 
things that are brought about by impulse are in our power; therefore neither 
assents nor actions are in our power. From this it follows that neither praise nor 
blame nor rewards nor punishments are just.” And since this is specious, they 
hold one may confidently conclude that not all the things that come to pass 
happen by fate. Moreover Chrysippus... distinguished kinds o f causes...5
Two o f the three texts adduced to refute this body o f evidence by Inwood {supra n. 1 46, 
178 noted by Ioppolo supra n.2 459 n. 15) come through Antiochus, the other through Plutarch. 
The first is Cicero Luc. 24-25 (SVF2.116):
Moreover the former is point is obvious, that a starting point must be established 
for wisdom to follow when it begins to do something; and that starting point is 
what accords with nature. For otherwise impulse (our name for ορμή), by which 
we are impelled to act and seek what has been presented, cannot be set in motion.
But that which moves it must first be presented, and then believed; and this 
cannot happen if the impression cannot be discerned from a false one. And how 
can the soul be moved to impulse if it is not perceived whether what is presented 
accords with nature or the opposite?6
Plutarch tries to prove Stoic inconsistency in the claim that assent is necessary for action 
(De Stoic rep. 1057A = SVF 3.177):
Indeed, what was the subject most argued by Chrysippus himself and Antipater 
in their debates with the Academics? That neither action nor impulse occur
5 qui autem ab iis dissentiebant, fato adsensiones liberabant negabantque feto adsensionibus adhibito necessitatem ab 
his posse removeri; iique ita disserebant: “si omnia feto fiuunt, omnia front causa antecedente; et si adpetitus, illa  
etiam quae adpetitum secuntur, ergo etiam adsensiones; at, si causa adpetitus non est sita in  nobis, ne ipse quidem 
adpetitus est in nostra potestate; quod si ita est, ne illa quidem quae adpetitu efficiuntur sunt sita in nobis; non sunt 
igitur ñeque adsensiones ñeque actiones in nostra potestate. ex quo efficitur ut nec laudationes iustae sint nec 
vituperationes nec honores nec supplicia.” quod cum vitiosum sit, probabiliter concludi putant non omnia feto fieri 
quaecumque fiant. Chrysippus autem...causarum genera distinguit...
6 Atque etiam illud perspicuum est, constituí necesse esse initium quod sapientia cum quid agere incipiat sequatur, 
idque initium esse naturae accommodatum. Nam aliter adpetitio (earn enim volumus esse ορμήν), qua ad agendum 
impellimur et id adpetimus quod est visum, moveri non potest; illud autem quod movet prius oportet videri, eique 
credi, quod fieri non potest si id quod visum erit discerní non poterit a falso; quo modo autem moveri animus ad 
adpetendum potest si id quod videtur non percipitur accommodatumne naturae sit an alienum?
4without assent; rather that those argue speciously and from empty hypotheses 
who think that when an appropriate impression is present, action or impulse 
occur without yielding or assenting.7
In the argument that follows, Chrysippus is said to hold that god and the wise man create false 
impressions to which one must not respond with assent or yielding, but only impulse. This 
would create an unassented action, which the Stoics would not admit (Inwood 85-86).
The other passage from Antiochus continues from the De fo to  (41-43 = SVF 2.9Ί4):
And so he meets that argument which I just concluded as follows: if all things 
happen by fate it does indeed follow that all things happen by antecedent causes, 
but not by principal and perfect causes, rather antecedent and proximate causes.
And if these themselves are not in our power it does not follow that not even 
impulse is in our power. But this would follow if we said that all things happen 
by perfect and principal causes, with the result that, since these causes are not in 
our power, not even impulse would be in our power...
As to the fact that assents occur by antecedent causes, he says that he can 
easily explain the meaning o f this. For although assent cannot occur unless roused 
by impression, nevertheless since it has impression as its proximate cause and not 
its principal cause, it can be explained in the way in which we have been 
discussing for some time now, just as Chrysippus wishes. It is not the case that 
the assent can occur without being stimulated by a force outside o f itself (for it is 
necessary that an assent be moved by impression); but Chrysippus falls back on 
his cylinder and cone, which cannot begin to move unless they are struck; but 
when this happens, he thinks that it is by its own nature, properly speaking, that 
the cylinder rolls and the cone turns. “Therefore,” he says, “just as the one who 
pushed the cylinder gave it the principal cause o f motion, but did not give it 
‘reliability’, so too impression which strikes us will ‘impress’ and, as it were,
‘stamp’ its image upon our mind, but assent will be in our power. And assent, 
just as was said about the cylinder, though pushed by something external, will 
thereafter be moved by its proper force and nature...8
7 καί μην έν yc rois 7rpo? τους ’Ακαδημαϊκού? άγώσιν 6 π  Κε ιστός λόγος αντώ re Χρυσίππω και Άντιπάτρω  
περί τίνος γέγονε; 7repi του μήτε πράττειν μ τβ  όρμον άσυγκαταθέτως, αλλά πλάσματα λέγειν και κενάς 
υποθέσεις τους άξιοϋντας οικείας φαντασίας γενομένης εύθυς όρμαν μη ει£αντας μηδε συγκαταθεμένους.
8 itaque illi rationi quam paulo ante conclusi sic occurrit: si omnia fato fiant, sequi illud quidem, ut omnia causis 
fiant antepositis, verum non principalibus causis et perfectis, sed adiuvantibus et proximis. quae si ipsae non sunt in 
nostra potestate, non sequitur ut ne adpetitus quidem sit in nostra potestate. at hoc sequeretur, si omnia perfectis et 
principalibus causis fieri diceremus, ut, cum eae causae non essent in nostra potestate, ne ille  quidem esset in nostra 
potestate...quod enim dicantur adsensiones fieri causis antepositis, id quale sit, facile a se explican putat. nam 
quamquam adsensio non possit fieri nisi commota viso, tarnen, cum id visum proximam causam habeat, non 
principalem, hanc habet rationem, ut Chrysippus vult, quam dudum diximus; non ut ilia quidem fieri possit nulla 
vi extrinsecus excitata (necesse est enim adsensionem viso commoveri) sed revertitur ad cylindrum et ad turbinem 
suum, quae mover! incipere nisi pulsa non possunt. id autem cum accidit, suapte natura, quod superest, et 
cylindrum volví et versar! turbinem putat. “ut igitur” inquit “qui protrusit cylindrum, dedit ei principium  
motionis, volubilitatem autem non dedit, sic visum obiectum imprimet illud quidem et quasi signabit in animo
5Now if Ioppolo’s evidence is rejected for coming from Academic and late sources, and if Cicero’s 
quotations are accepted on the assumption o f Antiochus’ faithful preservation o f Chrysippean 
doctrine, De fo to  40 is still not explained since it too is presumably filtered through Antiochus. I 
do not think there is inconsistency in Antiochus’ reporting. Rather if one reads both Luc. 24-25 
and De fo to  41-42 more closely, it is possible to construct a theory o f action that makes sense o f 
all the testimonia.
Π. A Reading of the Evidence
What is most striking is that no piece o f evidence claims that the cause o f impulse is 
assent to a hormetic impression. And that is what we would expect if Stobaeus’ report {supra 
n. 1) were using some sort o f short hand for, “a hormetic impression rouses impulse, after an 
hormetic impression receives assent’ (or “hormetic proposition” as Inwood argues infra n.17). 
Let us begin with the last passage, the most authoritatively Chrysippean.
Defa to  41-42 is remarkable for the way it treats impulse and assent separately. In the 
first response to  f40, only impulse is treated and no mention is made o f assent. The argument 
runs, “If  all things happened by primary and complete causes and these were not in our power, 
impulse would not be in our power; but this is not the case; primary and complete causes are in 
our power and therefore so is impulse.” No role is provided for assent in this argument; and 
there is no suggestion that impulse is in our power only because assent (occurring before it) is in 
our power (as Inwood seems to interpret). One might just as well conclude that impulse can be a 
primary and complete cause (like assent) and that impulse also is capable o f  breaking the chain o f 
necessity. The independence o f impulse is not subordinated to the independence o f assent. 
Rather the implication is that impulse might also be regarded as what makes man free.
The argument then shifts to a discussion o f how assent can come about by antecedent 
causes yet be free o f fate. And in the second argument there is no mention o f impulse. He says 
only that the antecedent cause o f assent is impression, in accordance with the common Stoic 
doctrine that persuasiveness o f impressions is the antecedent cause o f  evil.9 Chrysippus’ 
examples o f the cylinder and cone seem deliberately to set aside the issue o f  impulse. The 
problem is that unlike animals, objects do not have the power o f impulse; they are not capable o f 
self-motion. In his illustration there are two references that might allude to  impulse: the first is 
the external push; the second is his reference to suapte vi et natura, the idea that the objects move 
“by their own force and nature” . He is attempting to isolate the one element which gives the 
cylinder and cone “reliability”, that is, the power to roll or not to roll, the object’s “proper force 
and nature”. This corresponds well to assent: the cylinder roles and the cone circles because the 
unique defining characteristic o f each, their analogous equivalent o f “moral personality”, should 
properly be compared to assent. There is one more candidate for impulse -  the rolling itself; but
suam speciem, sed adsensio nostra erit in potestate, eaque, quem ad modum in cylindro dictum est, extrinsecus 
pulsa, quod reliquum est suapte v i et natura movebitur...”
9 D.L. 7.89 = SVF 3.228; Plut. De Stoic Rep. 1057B (= SVF 3.171); Galen PHP 5.320.18-19 D e Lacy = EK 
169.69-73; Epictetus Diss. 1.28, 2.18.24-26, Ench. 20.
6this should properly correspond to action, not to impulse (though possessing “rollability” the 
cylinder does nothing to  “initiate a movement”). In fact the impulse to roll begins before the 
analogue o f assent (rollability) and continues after it, resulting in action. I f  one will see an illusion 
to impulse in the simile, it must both precede and follow assent. In any event, one cannot argue 
that this text definitively shows assent as the sole cause o f impulse in man.
The question raised by the other two passages, Plut. De Stoic rep. 1057A-B and Luc. 24- 
25 is why the Stoics believed that taking assent from man would lead to apraxia. It is important 
to note that the point o f  attack o f Arcesilaus was not assent to  hormetic impression, but the non­
existence o f  “kataleptic impression,” φαντασία καταλτρττική.10 The conclusion that all assent 
would be impossible followed automatically. The Stoic apraxia argument was that removing 
kataleptic assent would make purposeful action impossible. The question o f assent to hormetic 
impression was left by the wayside. One must approach Plutarch and Antiochus in this context.
Luc. 24-25 argues that impulse cannot occur unless an impression has been 1) presented; 
2) believed, that is, distinguished from a false one; and 3) perceived whether it accords with 
nature. The first; poses no difficulty -  impression precedes impulse. The second involves 
assent, but clearly assent to a “kataleptic” impression, as the distinction discerní non poterit a  
fa lso  assures (cf. Luc. 2.77-78). Inwood, following Striker, argues that kataleptic impressions can 
never be hormetic because kataleptic impressions “compel our assent” (and one can be 
compelled, as it were, to recognize the veracity o f sensation, but not to act).11 That is, one is not 
assenting to the appropriateness o f an action in the second case, but only to whether the 
impression is a true o f  false representation o f the object. The hostile report o f Plutarch seems to 
fall into this same category. It does not show decisively whether Chrysippus and Antipater were 
arguing about the necessity o f assent to kataleptic or hormetic impressions. Given the context of 
“true” and “false” impressions (in the argument which follows Plutarch’s quotation above), it 
seems likely to have been to the kataleptic.
The third instance from Luc. 24-25 may seem to imply assent to  hormetic impression, 
but does not as Seneca makes clear, “Natural impulses are toward what is useful, natural 
aversions are from their opposites; without any thought to dictate it, without any deliberation, 
whatever nature has prescribed is done.”12 Seneca is speaking in this letter about the force o f 
ouceiW ts that orients all beings toward the constitution that accords with nature. This passage 
captures, I think, the proper sense o f “self evidently”, αύτοθέν , in the Stobaeus passage {supra 
n. 1) where το υ  καθήκοντος corresponds to Seneca’s utilia. Perceiving whether something 
accords with nature is still a process o f identification, e.g., whether something is food or is not 
food (which is “self-evidently” among the things appropriate to all animals). Luc. 24-25 is not 
alluding to the kind o f prudential consideration such as whether it is “appropriate” to  take the
10 So Inwood supra n .l 86-88. The two attacks were (Sext. Ad Math 7.151-57): 1) cognition (κατάληψη?) occurs 
either in a w ise man or a fool. In the wise man it is science (επιστήμη)', in the fool it is opinion (δόξα). Moreover 
cognition is not made to impressions but to propositions (αξιώματα). 2) No impression exists o f such a kind that it 
could not be false. See also Long and Sedley (supra n. 1) 1.455-60; G. Striker, “Skeptical Strategies,” in Schofield, 
Bumyeat and Barnes edd, Doubt and Dogmatism: Studies in Hellenistic Epistemology (Oxford 1980) 63-69.
11 Inwood supra n .l 59 n. 106 following Striker supra n.10 71-72. See also Inwood 76 and Cic. Luc. 2.38; Sext. 
Emp. Ad Math. 7.253-60; Epictetus Diss. 1.28.1-4.
12 naturales ad utilia impetus, naturales a contrariis aspemationes sunt; sine ulla cogitadone quae hoc dictet, sine 
consilio fit, quidquid natura praecepit. (Ep. 121.21)
7last piece o f food when others are hungry. One may conclude then that kataleptic assent 
necessarily precedes impulse (since we must recognize that a thing is what it appears to be, and 
is among the appropriate things), but not that assent to hermetic impression is(necessary to 
stimulate impulse.
ΙΠ. Impulses Are Assents
The one piece of evidence that most directly challenges the idea o f impulse preceding 
assent is Stobaeus Eel. 2.88 1 -6 (SVF 3.171). He explains that impulse and assent should be 
considered in two senses in a sort o f parallel process:
All impulses are assents, and the practical ones contain the power o f movement.
But assents are to one thing and impulses to another. That is, assents are made to 
certain propositions, but impulses are to the predicates contained somehow in the 
propositions to which we assent.13
Inwood and Ioppolo treat with skepticism the implication in the first line that there are “non- 
practical” impulses (impulses that lack the power o f movement).14
In response to their concern, Luc. 30 shows a sequence o f 1) impression; 2) impulse 
(when impelled by impressions); and 3) “We direct the senses to perceive objects.” It seems to 
imply an impulse not to action, but simply to perception, a good candidate for non-practical 
impulse. Seneca also speaks o f this kind o f impulse (Ep. 117.13): “I see Cato walking. Sensation 
has shown this; the mind has believed it. What I see is a body, to which I  direct my eyes and my 
mind.”15 Seneca’s use o f “direct,” intendit, echoes Luc. 30 But the remainder o f Luc. 30 goes on 
to describe why some impulses lead to action and others do not:
For the mind itself which is the source o f the senses and even is sensation itself 
has a natural force which it directs to the things by which it is moved. Thus it 
seizes on some impressions so as to use them immediately; it “stores away” 
others as it were, and from these memory arises; but the rest it arranges by 
similarities from which are produced notions o f things, which the Greeks call 
€vvoiai and npokrpj/eis. 16
13 7τόσα? δε τας όρμάς συγκαταθέσεις είναι, ras δε πρακτικάς και το κινητικόν περιέχειν. ηδη δε άλλω  [W.; 
άλλω ν von Arnim] μεν είναι συγκαταθέσεις, επ' ά'λλο δε όρμάς. και συγκαταθέσεις μεν άξιώμασί tutιν, ομράς 
δε έπι κατηγορήματα τα περιεχόμενά πως εν τοις άξιώμασιν, οίς συγκατατίθεσθαι. Luc. 38 suggests a similar 
parallel: nam quo modo non potest animal ullüm non adpetere it quod accommodation ad naturam adpareat (Graeci 
id οικειον appellant), sie non potest obiectam rem perspicuam non adpiobare.
14 A.M. Ioppolo, “Perception and Assent: A Physical and Cognitive Problem in Early Stoicism ,” CQ 40 (1990) 
445; cf. Inwood supra n .l 101 and n.271.
15 video Catonem ambulantem. Hoc sensus ostendit, animus credidit. Corpus est quod video, cui et oculos intendi 
et animum.
16 M ens enim ipsa quae sensuum fons est atque etiam ipsa sensus est, naturalem vim  habet quam intendit ad ea 
quibus movetur. Itaque alia visa sic arripit ut iis statim utatur, alia quasi recondit, e quibus memoria oritur, cetera
δIn ψ.6  (iSVF 2.103, cf. 102) we are told that the mind uses impulse to pursue cognition 
(κατάλη-ψις), quaestio autem est adpetitio cognitionis. While it is possible to construe the 
“natural force” in f30 as assent (as Chrysippus seems to do in the cylinder simile) %26 suggests 
strongly that impulse is more probable. Thus one candidate for “non-practical” impulse is the 
impulse to perceive objects.
But I think there is a stronger reading o f Stobaeus. To each impulse, there corresponds 
assent to a proposition.17 One might assume the impression that generates the impulse to 
perception is kataleptic, and that to action hormetic. But this is clearly wrong since only an 
hormetic impression can “move” an impulse (Stob, supra n. 1); there are no impulses generated 
by kataleptic impression. Rather, as Inwood shows {supra n. 1 86-87 and n.213), a single 
hormetic impression may also comprise a kataleptic impression to which kataleptic assent is 
given before impulse and hormetic assent come into play. But since all impulses are roused by 
hormetic impression, the evidence above from Luc. 26 and 30 must still apply to hormetic 
impression. I would argue that tos Ôè πρακτικας in the Stobaeus passage above should be 
interpreted to mean “those that are capable o f causing action” .18 This would mean that some 
impulses are not the efficient cause o f action and others are. These would correspond to 
impulses prior to  hormetic assent (which lack the authority / ability to cause action itself) and 
impulses subsequent to hormetic assent (which are the efficient causes o f action and “contain the 
power o f movement).
But if one removes preliminary impulse from association with hormetic assent, one must 
ask in what way “all impulses áre assents”, that is, to  what assent preliminary impulse would 
correspond. There is an answer suggested by Luc. 2.38:
Just as when weights are placed on a scale the pan must fall, so the mind must 
yield to clear impressions: for in no way can any animal fail to have an impulse to 
what appears in accordance with nature (the Greeks call it οικείοι/); so also it 
cannot fail to give approval to a clear impression o f an object.19
autem similitudinibus construit, ex quibus efficiuntur notitiae rerum, quas Graeci turn kvvoias turn προλήψεις 
vocant.
17 Since Stobaeus tells us that assents are made to propositions, Inwood postulates the existence o f an “hormetic” 
proposition to which assent to a hormetic presentation is properly made (supra η. 1 59-66). Ioppolo objects 1) that 
there is no evidence for such a thing, and 2) that evidence from the apraxia debate shows Zeno held that assents are 
to impressions while Arcesilaus argued contra that they are to propositions; therefore Stobaeus is reporting a later 
position, adopted by Chrysippus (supra n.2 457-62). She makes much o f the fact that Zeno regarded impression as 
a τύπωσις (D.L. 7.46 = SVF 2,53) that is, as an iconic process rather than a verbal one. But I see no evidence that 
the explanation in the last sentence o f the Stobaeus passage would be impossible for Zeno to accept (so Inwood 275 
n.95). Ioppolo argues that the Stobaeus passage abolishes temporal sequence, making impulse and assent identical 
or simultaneous (462). She takes Arcesilaus’ argument that assents are made to propositions (supra n. 10) to imply 
that temporal sequence had held for Zeno, but that Chrysippus did away with it. But the only evidence for this 
conclusion is her reading o f the Stobaeus passage.
18 Inwood suggests emendation to make the adjective refer to assents (supra η. 1 288 n.271), thereby making 
hormetic assent the cause o f impulse. But as I have said, there is no evidence that hormetic assent causes impulse.
19 ut enim necesse est lancem in libra ponderibus impositis deprimí, sic animum perspicuis cedere: nam quo modo 
non potest animal ullum non adpetere id quod accommodatum ad naturam adpareat (Graeci id οικείοv appellant), sic
9The passage is controversial because 1) it is late (Antiochus); 2) it uses dubious technical terms: 
cedere, perspicua; and 3) because it seems to assimilate human and animal action -  a move made 
by Arcesilaus which the Stoics should be eager to counter.20 But despite all these objections, it 
suggests an interesting possibility. The assent associated with the impulse to what accords with 
nature (an hormetic impression o f the appropriate, in Stobaeus’ phrase supra  n .l)  is not to an 
hormetic impression at all. Rather one has a preliminary impulse simultaneously with assent to a 
kataleptic impression. To recognize that some potential object o f choice is among the 
appropriate things is to have an impulse to it. That is, kataleptic assent and preliminary impulse 
may be identified. This passage mirrors the evidence from 1(24-25 where the assent needed for 
impulse was kataleptic: assent (to a kataleptic impression) that something is “among the 
appropriate things” is not assent (to an hormetic impression) that “it is fitting for me to act.” 
Cicero also implies the close relationship o f impulse and kataleptic assent in the most reliable o f 
passages, De fin . 3.16-18 (SVF  3.182, 189). When he describes human development, he assigns 
katalêpseis to children as among the objects o f their first impulse, the prôtê hormê. One might 
conclude that katalêpsis is among the things that children must acquire to use impulse correctly.
Now I do not mean to imply that no further assent is necessary for action. One does not 
take a piece o f food every time one has an impression o f it. Nor do I wish to imply that one may 
choose what kind o f preliminary impulse to have in a given situation, as though preliminary 
impulse were as clearly a matter o f free-will as assent. Yet I do wish to reserve for it 
independence from hormetic assent. The assimilation o f human action to animal action in Luc. 38 
obscures a vital issue o f moral responsibility that affects human action. Man possesses logos and 
every impression o f rational being is rational (D.L. 7.51 = SVF  2 .61) . Human impression differs 
from animal impression by containing lekta (ib id , Sext. Emp. A d  M ath  8.70 = SVF  2 . 187) . The 
state o f man’s logos plays a decisive role in the type o f impulse elicited.21 Logos is comprised o f 
the “pre-conceptions” (προλήψ εις) and “conceptions” (ivvo ia i) that make up experience (Aet. 
Plac. 4 .11.1 -4 = SVF  2 .83) . Epictetus argues that the cause o f improper actions is rooted in 
conceptions o f what is “appropriate” and in what is “in our power” and what is not. H is advice 
that we scrutinize this content o f logos (Diss. 1.22)  is intended as a corrective to  the tendency o f 
the unwise to have improper impulses. Thus the independence o f impulse is dependent upon the 
fact that logos is in our power. In the heat o f action, however, there is no time for reflection and 
impulse will follow according to the lekta elicited from the current state o f logos.
If  one assents that something is what it appears to be and that it is appropriate, it remains 
to be clarified how the rest o f the process works -  the relationship between preliminary impulse 
and assent to final impulse. Seneca explains in Ep. 113.18 (supra n.4): “Every rational animal 
does nothing unless first it has been aroused by the impression o f something, and then has had an
non potest obiectam rem perspicuam non adprobare. Cf. the similarity o f language to Plut. Adv. Col. 1I22A-B  
{supra n.3) and D e Stoic, rep. 1057A {supra n.7).
20 Inwood (88 and nn.218-219); F. H. Sandbach, “Phantasia Katalêptikê,” in  A.A. Long ed.. Problems in Stoicism 
(U. London 1971) 15.
21 One need not read Sen. Ep. 121.21 to mean that impulse is not dependent upon any act o f reason. One must be 
able to identify objects as being what they appear to be and as appropriate. This requires kataleptic assent, and as 
assent is to propositions, lekta w ill be required.
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impulse, and then assent has confirmed this impulse. What this assent is, I shall explain. ‘It is 
appropriate that I walk’; then finally I walk, whenever I have said this to myself and approved 
this opinion o f mine.” His verb for “it is appropriate”, oportet, is the usual Latin translation for 
καθήκον. This is the vital content o f  the hormetic impression that rouses impulse (Stob, supra 
n. 1). This, Seneca argues, is also contained in the assent to the hormetic impression, which takes 
the form oportet me am bulare22 One might conclude from his description that oportet me 
ambulare is a verbal representation associated with the impulse he already has and the kataleptic 
assent he has already made. It cannot be a representation o f them, because impulses are only to 
predicates, are not propositional, and lack the vital operator, me (D.L. 7.64). He calls the 
proposition, oportet me ambulare, an “opinion” or “weak assent,” doxa, which one would not 
attribute to the wise man. But it is natural to call it so if impulse coincides with mere 
identification o f (that is, kataleptic assent to) the object as “among the appropriate things.” To 
assent that “to walk is appropriate”, oportet ambulare, almost demands consideration by assent 
o f the associated proposition oportet me ambulare. An agent must determine whether this 
appropriate thing is appropriate “for him” in light o f prudential considerations.
IV. Impulse and the Role of Character in Action
To Seneca’s wording one might object “the wise man never opines” (D.L. 7.121 = SVF  
3.549). One possible explanation for this might be that the wise man has completely harmonized 
his impulses to accord with reason and deliberation is unnecessary (Inwood 109; Epictetus Diss.
1.2.12-13). He alone is in a position to make assent and impulse to an hormetic impression 
coincide, because the state o f his logos is so consistent that his preliminary impulse need never 
conflict with the demands o f reason. The defining characteristic o f the wise man is that all his 
kathêkonta are katorthômata. The rest o f mankind lives with rational inconsistency and thus 
must deliberate upon the best course o f action given conflicting lekta and impulses. The course 
o f action we adopt will be determined by two factors: our character, that is, the tensional hexis of 
each o f the powers o f our soul, which represents the way we have been shaped by past actions; 
and by our capacity to improve or damage character by acting independently o f it. Chrysippus’ 
explanation o f the relation o f fate to free-will in De fo to  41-3 establishes the crucial capacity o f 
assent to  escape from the causal nexus that would exist if character alone determined each new 
action. For then each action would be determined by prior actions in endless succession.
Epictetus speaks about the effect o f independent assent upon the hexis or state o f our 
impulse (Diss. 2.18.6-9):
Whenever you have yielded to intercourse with someone, do not count this a 
single yielding, rather add that you have fed and increased your weak will. For it 
is inevitable that from corresponding actions, some dispositions (hexeis) and 
powers (dunameis) will come into existence that were not there before, and others 
will be intensified and strengthened. In this way, to be sure, the philosophers say
22 Inwood supra n .l 86-87; Cic. Tuse. Disp. 3.74; Long and Sedley supra n .l 1.421.
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that infirmities arise. For as soon as you begin to desire money, if reason is 
applied to the perception and judges it an evil, the desire is halted and our 
hegemonikon is restored to its original state. But if you apply no remedy, it no 
longer goes back to the same state; rather the next time, roused by the 
corresponding impression, it is swept into desire more quickly than before.23
The hexis about which he is speaking is clearly that o f impulse, because he speaks o f  a desire 
(epithumia) arising from an impression -  before reason is applied -  more quickly the second time 
the impression is encountered The implication is that assents have a material impact upon the 
state o f our impulses, upon their hexeis. Origen makes the same point (from the standpoint o f 
moral progress rather than decay) using the same example:
But if someone should say that the external event is such that it is impossible for 
him, being o f such a character, to resist it, let him consider his own passions and 
motions [sc. o f the soul] to see if perhaps there is not an agreement and assent and 
inclination o f the mind to this act because o f these particular persuasive factors 
[sc. in the situation]. For, let us say, -  a woman appears to a man who has 
decided on sexual restraint and celibacy and summons him to do something against 
his resolution -  she is not the perfect cause of him putting aside his resolution.
For in each instance he consents to the titillation and smoothness o f the pleasure 
and, being unwilling to resist it or to stand by his decision, he does the 
intemperate thing. Another fellow will behave in the opposite way, when the 
same circumstances occur, if he has learned and practiced more lessons. For the 
titillations and allures occur, but his reason, because it has been strengthened and 
nourished by training and confirmed in its beliefs with respect to virtue (or close 
to it), thrusts away the allures and dissolves the desire.24
23 oraV ήττηθής τίνος εν συνουσία, μή την μίαν ήτταν ταύτην λογίζου, ά λλ’ ότι καί την άκρασίαν σου 
τέτροφας, επηύξησας. αδύνατον γάρ άπό των καταλλήλων έργων μη καί τας έξεις καί to s  δυνάμεις τας μεν 
εμφύεσθαι μη πρότερον οϋσας, τάς δ’ επιτείνεσθαι καί ίσχυροποιείσθαι. ούτως αμελεί καί τα άρρωστήματα 
ύποφύεσθαι λέγουσιν οί φιλόσοφοι, όταν γάρ anταξ επιθυμτησης αργυρίου, αν μεν προσαγθή λόγος εις 
αϊσθησιν αξων του κακού, πέπαυταί τε η επιβυμία καί το ηγεμονικόν ημών εις το έξαρχης άποκατέσττρ εάν δε 
μηδέν ττροσαγάγης εις θεραπείαν, ούκετι εις ταύτά επάνεισιν, άλλα πάλιν ερεθισθεν υπό της καταλλήλου 
φαντασίας Θάττον ερεθισθεν υπό της καταλλήλου φαντασίας θαττόν η πρότερον εξήφθη προς την 
επιθυμίαν.
24 εί δε τις αυτό το έξωθεν λεγοι είναι τοιόνδε, ώστε άδυνάτως εγειν άντιβλέφαι αύτφ τοιφδε γενομενω, 
ούτος επιστησάτω τοις ίδίοις πάθεσι καί κινημασιν, ει μη εύδόκησις γίνεται καί συγκαταθεσις καί ροπή τον  
ηγεμονικού επί τόδε τι διά τάσδε τάς πιθανότητας, ου γάρ, φερ’ είπείν, η γυνή τφ  κρίναντι εγκρατεύεσθαι 
καί άνέγειν εαυτόν άπό μίξεων, επιφανεΐσα καί προκαλεσαμενη επί τό ποιήσαί τι παρά πρόθεσιν, αυτοτελής 
αιτία γίνεται του τήν πρόθεσιν αθέτησαι. πάντως γάρ εύδσκήσας τφ γαργαλισμφ καί τφ λείω τής ηδονής, 
άντιβλεψαι αύτφ μή βεβουλημενος μήδε τό κεκριμενον κυρίόσαι, πράττει τό άκόλαστον. ό δε τις εμπαλιν, 
των αυτών συμβεβηκότων αύτφ πλείονα μαθήματα άνειληφότι καί ήσκηκότι· οί μεν γαργαλισμοί καί οί 
ερεθισμοί συμβαίνουσιν, ό λόγος δε, ατε επί πλεΐον ισχυροποιηθείς καί τραφείς τή μελέτη καί βεβαιωθείς 
τοίς δόγμασι προς τό καλόν ή εγγύς γε του βεβαιωθήναι γεγενημένος, ανακρούει τούς ερεθισμούς καί 
ύπεκλύει τήν επιθυμίαν.
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The choice o f  sexual attraction as exemplum  is particularly interesting, because it is one o f the 
more automatic o f human responses. Even in the case o f Origen’s moral progressor, before 
reason can be applied, desire (epithumia) already exists. That is to say, an impulse clearly 
precedes assent. That is not to say that it determines assent; on the contrary the reactions o f the 
phaulos and the prokoptôn  are markedly different. The inferior man goes forward with the desire 
and assents to  it, but the moral progressor withholds assent. Origen brings up the argument to 
prove that we do assent whether we realize it or not, when we allow the desire to go forward, and 
Epictetus shows that this assent has further implications for our character. The moral progressor 
is someone who has two weapons: sound opinions that aid his current choice; but also training, 
that is, past rejections o f similar impressions that have shaped his character. In Epictetus’ 
example we see the hexis o f impulse described as an important component o f character. It is in 
this context that we should interpret the words o f Stobaeus, as he defines the last o f five species 
o f impulse (Eel. 2.87.11-12), “when the hexis hormêtikê is added, which indeed the Stoics call 
impulse in its own sense, as the origin from which impulse occurs; impulse is used in five 
senses.”25 Impulsive hexis can be called an impulse because is “the cause” o f impulse in a certain 
sense. What “moves” an impulse, Stobaeus tells us, is the impression. But the psychic 
disposition that determines the nature o f the impulse is the hexis. If  one thinks o f this hexis as a 
part o f character, Stobaeus is asserting that character “acts”; and when it acts, it produces another 
impulse in accordance with which we may be said to “act” in the manner o f the second impulse.
The interesting question is not why the phaulos and the prokoptôn  assent differently, but 
why they have the same epithumia. Seneca says that nature gives man “natural impulses to what 
is useful and natural aversions to the opposite” and “whatever nature prescribes is done without 
deliberation” (Ep. 121.21). The phaulos and the prokoptôn were each presented with something 
natural, intercourse. Even the wise man will procreate (D.L. 7.121 = SVF  1.270). But 
intercourse is among the indifferent things, neither good nor evil, and as such may be used well or 
badly (D.L. 7.102 = SVF  3.117). The indifferents that are in accordance with nature (τα  κατά 
φ ύσ ιν ) and contribute to a harmonious life have value (αξία) and are preferred (προηγμένα); 
those that do not accord with nature and detract from this life have disvalue (απαξία) and are 
dispreferred (άποπροηγμένα); and those that have neither value nor disvalue are indifferent in an 
absolute sense (Stob. Eel. 2.83.10-11, D.L. 7.105 = SVF 3.124, 126). The preferred indifferents 
by virtue o f being “in accordance with nature” meet the definition o f τό καθήκον, and are “the 
material and origin”, the ΰλη  and αρχή, o f “appropriate acts” καθήκοντα  (Plut. De com. not. 
1069E = SVF  3:491). But there is an important distinction to be made: impulses to appropriate 
things do not always result in appropriate acts, as for instance in the case o f the phaulos and the 
prokoptôn  above whose impulses to something appropriate, intercourse, were inappropriate 
(outside the context o f marriage and procreation). Like Seneca, Zeno linked kathêkon to 
oikeiôsis, defining the appropriate as τα ΐs κατά φ ύσ ιν  κατασκζναις οίκζίον, “what is oriented 
to nature’s arrangements”; but he distinguished acts according to impulse as appropriate, the 
opposite, and neither (D.L. 108 = SVF 3.493, 495). The determining criterion among the three is 
what is dictated by reason in its normative sense (ibid).
25 προστζθείσης δέ και τής'έξζως τής ορμητικής, ήν δή και ιδίως ορμήν λέγουσιν, άφ’ ον συμβαίνει όρμάν, 
ττ^νταγώς.
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Now the examples from Epictetus and Origen above have both the phaulos and the 
prokoptôn conceive an epithumia, one o f the four cardinal passions. The moral progressor 
withholds assent to his impulse and cannot be said really to have suffered a passion. The 
Zenonian definition o f passion includes the element o f wrong assent ( doxa) to an hormetic 
impression (Cic. Tuse. Disp. 3.74, Galen PHP 4 p.281.24 De Lacy = SVF  1.212). The status of 
such an impulse is then called into question; for lacking assent, it cannot be called epithumia in 
the same sense as the phaulos ’ subsequent passion. Zeno acknowledged that there must be 
something preliminary to passion, that resembles it. Seneca attributes to him the phrase 
“shadows o f  passions”, umbras affectuum (De ira 1.16.7 = SVF 1.215); the usual term is 
προπάθειαι or “preliminary passions” .26 Seneca addresses himself to the problem, using a wide 
array o f examples: shivering; sudden recoil on touching something; the hair standing on end at bad 
news; blushing; dizziness; the kind o f anger an audience may feel at a play; our reactions to music 
or war-trumpets; the mental shock caused by gruesome pictures or an execution; smiling or crying 
when others do (De ira 2.2). He calls them proludentia adfectibus, the “preludes” or “warm­
ups” to the passions. Most o f the examples Seneca chooses are bodily reactions, but the mention 
o f an audience’s anger at something shown at a theatre, suggests a psychic dimension to all o f 
them (cf. his comparison o f bodily and psychic aspects in 2.4.). I think one might reasonably 
add Origen’s exemplum  to his list “the sexual attraction one feels in the face o f a seduction”. 
Seneca distinguishes these reactions from the passions by insisting they are involuntary and 
unavoidable. Even the sage retains a psychic scar, leaving him liable to some o f  them (D e ira 
1.16.7 supra). Seneca explicitly withholds the label impetus, “impulse”, from the preliminary 
passions, but he does incorporate them into his theory o f action. He says “the first motion is 
involuntary, a preparation for passion, as it were, and a threatening o f some kind” est prim us 
motus non voluntarius, quasipraeparatio adfectus et quaedam comminatio (2.4.1). The term 
prim us motus is later calledprimum ictum  (2.4.2) “the first blow” to the mind, which he 
explicitly places in the same category as the other preliminary passions (2.2.2). Thus in Seneca’s 
eyes the important aspect o f this problem is not how to account for dizziness vel sim. in the 
theory o f action, but that such events lead to real passions in inferior men. Since these reactions 
are unavoidable, Seneca is compelled, I think, to say they are in accordance with nature, which 
brings us back to the problem of to kathêkon and his assertion that our impulse to utilia and our 
aversion to the opposite is done without deliberation, and thus, Epictetus claims, involuntarily 
(Diss. 1.28.5-6). Seneca clarifies that while some reaction to such stimuli is inevitable, the kind 
o f reaction one has is not, “Reason cannot overcome these things, but perhaps habit and constant 
observation may attenuate them”, ista non potest ratio vincere, consuetudo fartasse et adsidua 
observado externat (2.4.2). Thus to some extent the nature o f our preliminary passions is “in 
our power” έφ’ ημίν.
Epictetus’ description above explains that we have control over the hexis o f our impùlse 
in the sense that we can improve it or damage it by our assents. In both his example and that o f 
Origen, the phaulos and the prokoptôn suffer a preliminary epithumia. As Seneca says, if 
unchecked, this impulse may lead to passion; it is the job o f assent to halt the impulse, just as
26 On the preliminary passions, see Inwood (supra n. 1) 175-81 and “Seneca and Psychological Dualism” in 
Brunschwig and Nussbaum, Passions and Perceptions (Cambridge 1993) 150-83.
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Origen’s prokoptôn  does. Zeno is credited with defining passion as “a motion o f the soul that is 
irrational and contrary to nature, or an excessive impulse” η άλογος m l παρά φ ύσ ιν  "ψυχής 
κινησις, η όρμη πλεονάζουσα; by “excessive” he means “disobedient to reason” απειθή τω  
aιροϋντι λόγω  (D.L. 7.110; Stob. Eel. 2.88.9 = SVF  1.205). It was very difficult for the Stoics 
to explain how this could be occur in a monistic model o f the soul. Posidonius exploits 
Chrysippus’ attempts to  explain the origin o f excess, that is, how impulse could seem to disobey 
reason (Galen PHP  4 p.242.2-8 De Lacy = SVF 3.462). The Stoics had, however, a sound 
explanation for why impulse might cease to obey reason. There are different kinds o f impulses: 
one’s impulse to the good (ορεξις) is unrestrained, α υ το τελ ή  (Stob. Eel. 2.75.1-3 = SVF 3 .131); 
the good is “what to be chosen” (2.97.15-21 = SVF 3.91). The Stoics define epithumia as “an 
irrational orexis or a pursuit o f something falsely supposed to  be good” (SVF  3.391). Since both 
the good and the preferred indifférents are among the things in accordance with nature, and thus 
appropriate, there is the possibility o f confusion when an agent is presented with to kathêkon. 
What distinguishes “rational” from “irrational” orexis is whether one’s identification o f the object 
is true or false. Thus kataleptic assent and the state o f logos that generates its lekta (by which 
we identify things as true or false representations o f what they appear to be) plays an important 
role in the Stoic theory o f passion.
But the texts from Epictetus and Seneca above suggest that one has some control over the 
type o f impulse used as well, a control that appears to be independent o f the kataleptic assent o f 
the moment. The nature o f preliminary impulse differs from wise man to fool. Seneca had 
suggested that training may be beneficial. Epictetus advises the prokoptôn  to avoid the use o f 
orexis altogether and to use impulse “lightly”; the true progressor, he says, “stands watch as if he 
were his own enemy scheming against himself’ (fr. 27, Ench. 49). He so strongly believes that 
using the wrong kind o f impulse is a significant cause o f passion that he seems to remove the 
impulse to the good (orexis) and from the evil (ekklisis) from impulse, making it a coordinate 
genus: we must use impulse for the things outside our control and reserve orexis for the things 
under our control (action in accordance with virtue).27 His claim that one can choose to use one 
kind o f impulse over another implies that impulse is under our control in some meaningful way 
apart from kataleptic assent. For in his example o f intercourse (supra Diss. 2.18.6-9) Epictetus 
warns that a single assent to intercourse materially alters the hexis hormêtikê, assuring that the 
impulse to epithumia will arise more quickly the next time.
Stobaeus says that the cause o f passion, the excessive impulse, is “the false supposition” 
(Eel. 90.7-18 = SVF  3.394), by which he implies that when one assents to the object as being 
good or not, the kind o f  impulse is determined automatically. But he also says o f the hardened 
state o f the soul corrupted by passion, sickness (νόσημα), that it is “a judgment o f epithumia 
that has degenerated and hardened into a hexis, according to which what is not to be chosen is to 
be chosen strongly” νόσημα  δ’ είναι δόζαν επιθυμίας ερρυηκυιαν εις εζ ιν  και ενεσκιρω μένην, 
καθ’ ην ύπολαμβάνουσι τα  μη  αιρετά σφοδρά αιρετά είναι (Eel. 2.93.6-8 = SVF  3.421, Inwood 
supra η. 1 163). This remark helps to explain why he calls impulse rational, λο γικ ή  (Eel. 2.87.1- 
13 = SVF  3.169). The character o f our impulse can be described by an opinion, doxa, which is
27 Inwood (supra n. 1) 114-126; Epictetus Diss. 2.17. Epictetus does appear to reunite them when he discusses 
kathêkonta 3.7.25-26.
subject to our control. When the phaulos assents to intercourse, he also changes the disposition 
o f his impulse, giving it the new doxa that “what is not to be chosen is to be chosen” . As his 
hexis degenerates he will be inclined to choose this thing more and more strongly. To reverse 
these effects, he must at some point withhold assent to the ever increasing demands o f his 
impulsive character. For this reason bad character strains against moral improvement just as 
good character builds on its own momentum. When Epictetus advises the moral progressor not 
to use orexis at all, that is, not to have any unrestrained impulses to the good (because he lacks 
wisdom, the ability to judge what is good, D.L. 7.92 = SVF  3.265), he means for him to form an 
assent that will alter the character o f his impulse o f the sort “nothing is to  be chosen (α Ιρζτόν) 
unreservedly (auTorcX-qs)” . One finds frequent mention o f the concept o f “reservation” 
(ύπ^ζαίρ ecns:) in the sources, “a holding back from the use o f haeresis?’ in one’s dealings with 
things that do not pertain to virtue.28 When Stobaeus says that false supposition is the cause o f 
passion, one must add that there are two antecedent causes o f it: the impression and the state o f 
one’s impulsive character. O f these, the latter, is in the control o f the agent in the special sense 
that he may alter it by his assent. The important conclusion to be drawn from this evidence is 
that the hexis or character o f reason, logos, may include more than mere experiences o f what is 
good, evil and neither. It may include assents that determine impulsive hexis as well. We have 
the ability to: pursue things with impulse lightly or strongly, and in this sense also character is 
within our power and cannot be attributed to necessity.
IV. Reason as “Craftsman” of Impulse
Inwood’s construction o f impulse as “a command to oneself which one obeys” (supra  n.l 
62) leaves little room for the role o f impulse in action that I have suggested above. I f  impulse 
merely obeys reason, it cannot properly be said to be a locus o f human freedom. The proper 
locus would have to be assent. But the evidence from Chrysippus in D efa to  41-43 suggests that 
there are two poles, impulse and assent. I associated impulse with character (there are other 
aspects o f character; this is only one) in an effort to show consistency among earlier and later 
Stoic texts on the subject o f impulse. The main thrust o f this argument is that kataleptic assent 
precedes impulse, but hormetic assent follows it. As such, preliminary impulse is in a position 
to influence action independently o f hormetic assent. I have yet to explain, however, what 
happens to  impulse after final assent.
In texts on the scala naturae there is general consistency in the claim that: 1) stones have 
hexis (they have states, but movement is external to them); plants have phusis (the ability to 
grow, an internal movement); animals have impression and impulse (the power o f movement 
“from themselves” when stimulated by impression), but man possesses also the power o f reason 
(which makes possible movement “through his own agency”, a perfect cause o f action as distinct 
from the antecedent cause o f impression).29 Each level o f being possesses the characteristics o f
28 Inwood {supra n. 1) 165-73; Stob. Eel. 115.5-9 (= SVF 3.564); Seneca De ben. 4.34 (=  SVF 3.565); Epictetus fir. 
27, Ench. 49.
29 Inwood {supra n .l) 21-27; Origen In Princ. 3.1.2-3 (= SVF 2.988), De orat. 6.1 (=  SVF 2.989); Sim plicius/«  
Arisott. Cat.p.306 (= SVF 2.499).
the previous level, which change in form at the higher level o f being. So for instance plants grow, 
but animals grow in a radically different manner than plants. Plants have hexis but their states are 
o f a higher sophistication than those o f rocks. With man, then, impulse cannot properly be 
considered the same as that o f animals. Man possesses rational impulse, an impulse in 
accordance with which he may “act” in the true sense o f the word.
Stoic texts on human development, however, emphasize that man is bom with only 
impression and impulse actualized; reason is latent (Hierocles 1.5-33, 4.38-53). Thus children are 
pre-rational and their moral status is that o f animals, though they exhibit outward signs o f 
progress toward the acquisition o f reason at age seven, a development completed only at age 
fourteen when one becomes a fully responsible moral being (Aet. Plac. 4.11.1-4 = SVF  2.83).
Each o f the orders o f beings is “oriented” or “appropriated” by nature to nature. Thus to 
kathêkon is shared by all orders o f beings, though it differs for each: for plants it is natural to 
grow, for animals it is to move in accordance with impulse, for man it is to act in accordance with 
reason (D.L. 7.86 = SVF  3.178). Diogenes concludes this discussion o f  the scala by explaining 
that after reason is given to rational beings, their life according to nature becomes a life according 
to reason, “for this (sc. reason) comes after as a craftsman over impulse” τςγνίτης yap ovtos 
kmyivtTOA τής ορμής. The impulse o f one who follows reason will be “craftsmanlike”; thus an 
impulse in accordance with reason will be, like the product o f any craftsman, a reflection o f its 
maker. But this explanation is offered in the context o f the scala. Impulse exists in animals and 
in children. Reason supervenes upon it at the age o f seven and transforms it, but the impulse 
existed prior to the actualization o f reason. Moreover, the use o f “craft” as an image suggests 
that impulse is the craft that reason practices: just as shoemakers shape shoes with skill, reason 
shapes impulse. One need not take this to mean that impulse is merely the product o f reason, as 
though impulse were brought into existence by reason. One may just as easily argue, taking the 
image o f a craft rather literally, that assent leaves its mark upon impulse, turning raw material 
into finished product.
If  one accepts that impulse precedes hormetic assent, then is shaped and transformed by 
it into a fully rational product, some fundamental Stoic problems are solved more easily. The 
Stoics will have an explanation for the feeling o f attraction to something prior to decision. They 
will have a more probable explanation for the origin o f the passions: nature makes “the things in 
accordance with nature” attractive by providing an impulse to them. But this impulse need not 
carry with it the central weakness o f dualism -  the doctrine that man has something irrational in 
his very make-up. Rather it would say simply that there is a force that may pull against reason, 
but this force was designed by nature to be amenable to reason. There is a grave difference 
between the recognition that intercourse is among the appropriate things, toward which impulse 
impels us qua natural thing, and the assent that it is right for me in my circumstances to have 
intercourse with this specific person. The former process helps to explain human behavior in 
natural terms; the latter retains the doctrine that man is responsible for living according to reason. 
Perhaps most importantly, however, this reading o f the evidence allows meaningful and 
substantial agreement on the role o f impulse in action from Zeno to Epictetus. If  preliminary 
impulse had always been a part o f doctrine, Zeno and Seneca could be in substantial agreement on 
the cause o f the passions. Lastly such a portrait helps to  explain the motivations o f Posidonius 
and perhaps Panaetius and others to make a move toward dualism. Posidonius will have been
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motivated not so much by the desire to bring the Stoa over to dualism, as by the need to explain 
just what it is to which our impulse is drawn. His claim that the cause o f passion sometimes 
arises in the “passionate” faculty and sometimes in the “theoretical” will have resonance with the 
monistic model in which not only false suppositions (weak assents) but also character (the nature 
of the impulse stimulated) can contribute to passion (Galen PHP  5 p.320.23-28 De Lacy = EK  
169.77-84). Further, it makes late Stoic emphasis upon training and restraint in our impulses 
consistent with doctrines o f the old Stoa.
Lastly it joins the Stoa more closely to the model o f automatic action we see in Aristotle 
De motu animalium  7 701A. We have a disposition that says “I must drink” and upon the 
impression o f something drinkable, we take it automatically. One finds frequent reference to 
yielding in sources purporting to represent the old Stoa (Plutarch, Antiochus). Without a 
doctrine o f preliminary impulse, yielding is impossible, since assent must actively generate an 
impulse. But within a model o f action in which assent to the proposition “walking is 
appropriate” is accompanied by an impulse to walk, further assent to the hormetic proposition 
“it is appropriate for me to walk” is not strictly necessary. Assent could abdicate its duty and 
allow impulse to result in action. In this way, the origin o f passion is more easily explained .
This is without doubt a controversial re-reading o f many Stoic texts but, I hope, a 
persuasive account that will lead to further discussion on the Stoic doctrine o f impulse.
